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Louisiana Legislation of 1944*
I. MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE CIVIL CODE
HARRIET S. DAGGETt
The 1944 regular session of the legislature made but five
changes so far as specific articles of the Civil Code of 1870 are
concerned. This procedure follows the usual policy. The statement
is often made that "it is easier to amend the State Constitution
than the Civil Code." The 1944 record again supports this expres-
sion since there were twenty-one proposals for constitutional
change subject, of course, to the people's approval.
Act 23 of 1944 repealed Article 101 of the Civil Code in its
entirety. Article 101 appeared as follows:
"Before granting the [marriage] license, the person authorized
to issue the same shall require of the intended husband a bond,
with a surety in a sum proportioned to his means, With condi-
tion that there exists no legal impediment to the marriage.
The duration of the security is limited to two years."
Certainly the old article added little to the regularization of
marriage as it was practically dead timber, had been declared by
the court' to be directory only, and was unfair in its terms as it
cast the burden upon the husband alone to be certain that no legal
impediment to the marriage existed. However, the policy of ther
law was excellent in its attempt to safeguard marriage. In the
opinion of the writer, more attention to marriage laws, and their
enforcement would tend to lessen the number of divorces which
are increasing so alarmingly. Furthermore, if all the marriage
t Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
*It has been the policy of the Louisiana Law Review each legislative
year to survey the work of the Louisiana legislature. For the legislative ses-
sions of 1938 and 1940 these surveys were comprehensive in scope (Louisiana
Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 80; Louisiana Legislation of
1940 (1940) 3 LoUISIAN-A LAW Rnvimw 98). However, during the period of the war
depletions both in the faculty rank and in the membership of the legal pro-
fession of the state have made necessary a restriction in the scope of our
effort. Consequently the present discussion is confined to matters related to
the Civil Code and Criminal Law and Procedure.
1. State v. Trull, 147 La. 444, 85 So. 70 (1920).
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laws could be viewed by the legislature as a unit and revised as
a whole, the result would probably be much more desirable than
the piecemeal process presently followed.
Act 49 of 1944 amended and re-enacted Article 1787 of the
Civil Code to read:
"A married woman may act as mandatary, and her acts will
bind the mandator and the person with whom she contracts,
although she be not authorized by her husband; she may also
act as mandatary for her husband or for the community when
authorized by her husband."
The new portion of the article is the statement that "she may also
act as mandatary for her husband or for the community when
authorized by her husband." It had been assumed that the wife
might so act. However, doubts had been expressed, particularly
by title examiners in regard to contracts made by wives whose
husbands had left a power of attorney with them when entering
the service of the United States. Hence, it seems highly desirable
that the legislature made this matter certain for the future. The
deleted portion of the old article-"But the mandator has no
action against her on the contract"-had apparently been already
rendered obsolete by previous passage of the series of "married
women's emancipatory acts.
' 2
Act 200 of 1944 amended and re-enacted Article 155 of the
Civil Code to read:
"Separation from bed and board carries with its [sic] separa-
tion of goods and effects. Upon reconciliation of the spouses, the
community may be re-established by husband and wife jointly,
as of the date of the filing of the suit for separation from bed
and board, by an act before a notary, and two witnesses,
which act shall be recorded in the conveyance records of the
Parish where said parties are domiciled."
The old article contained but the first 'sentence. This change
will be welcomed by the many persons who have been advocating
it for some years.' A series of decisions' had established the rule
that upon reconciliation of the spouses after a judgment of separa-
tion, the community was not re-established, though in every
2. See Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code (1942) 10 et seq.
3. Daggett, Suggestions for the Consideration of the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW RiV w 895; Comment
(1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 422.
4. Comment (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 422.
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other respect reconciliation wipes out the effect of the judgment
of separation. The court seems to have originally arrived at this
conclusion because the Louisiana Code did not specifically provide
for re-establishment of the community, as did the French Code.5
The new act remedies this deficiency. Hereafter those persons
who wish to re-establish the community have a simple and in-
expensive procedure provided them. The only danger may be to
those who are not aware of this effect of the judgment of separa-
tion nor of the new remedy. Those who are in the financial
bracket where heavy taxes are payable will undoubtedly be
apprised. Those who are less well favored in worldly goods may
suffer the same surprise and discomfort attendant upon the final
discovery as has often been the case in the past. Particularly is
this true, of course, of the wife. However, had the legislature
made re-establishment of the community an automatic result of
reconciliation, the uncertainties of the event of reconciliation, a
troublesome matter to establish at times even for a court, would
have produced an intolerable situation for conveyancers, bankers,
title examiners and others. This practical consideration may have
been the underlying reason for the courts' position in the first
place.
Some students of the situation had suggested that the com-
munity simply be continued until final divorce.6 This seemed fair
and logical to the writer, that the life span of the community
(unless the parties contract otherwise) coincide with that of the
marriage, as the husband is responsible for the support 7 of the
wife as long as the marriage lasts and the wife has the injunctive
weapon against fraud and concealment.8
Since the passage of the two year9 divorce law, it would seem
that all of the complexities of the separation of bed and board
might be done away with. The waiting period provided for cooling
of anger is cared for better by voluntary separation, than by a
judgment of court arrived at after much public washing of "dirty
family linen," a painful and time wasting, if not actually harmful
process surely enjoyed only by exhibitionists or seekers after
vengeance. The whole subject needs re-evaluation in the light of
present realities. For example, should adultery be grounds for
immediate and absolute divorce while an attempt on the life war-
5. Id. at 428.
6. Daggett, supra note 3.
7. Art. 148, La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. Arts. 149, 150, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. La. Act 430 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2202].
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rants separation only? 10 However, a radical change would doubt-
less have met with serious opposition while the helpful bit con-
tained in Act 200 is now the law.
The provision for making the re-establishment of community
retroactive to date of filing of suit for separation is again desirable
as fact finding for the interim status would have been most la-
borious with doubtless uncertain results.
Act 50 of 1944 amended Article 198 of the Civil Code to read
as follows:
"Children born out of marriage, except those who are born
from an incestuous or adulterous connection, are legitimated
by the subsequent marriage of their father and mother, when-
ever the latter have formally or informally acknowledged
them for their children either before or after the marriage."
This act seems highly desirable so far as legal exigencies are
concerned. A further and more important consideration is that
the statute is at least a slight step in the right direction, socially.
Under the previous language of the article natural children must
have been acknowledged prior to or concurrently with the mar-
riage ceremony of their parents in order for legitimation to result
from the marriage of their parents.-' Apparently formal acknowl-
edgement was. contemplated while the jurisprudence of more
recent years has found informal acknowledgement by either
mother or father sufficient to entitle natural children to inherit.
12
There seems to be stronger reason why informal acknowl-
edgement should be sufficient for legitimation by marriage than
in case of inheritance as the intention of the parents by virtue of
their marriage is more forcefully demonstrated. Again, since the
fairly recent decisions declaring informal acknowledgment suffi-
cient for inheritance purposes, question had been raised as to
whether the court might not take the same view in interpreting
Article 198 on legitimation. Doubt had thus been cast upon the
status of informally acknowledged children whose parents had
married, a troublesome question for conveyancers, title examiners
and others.
Under the method of legitimation set forth by Article 200 of
10. Arts. 138, 139, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Succession of Roach, 155 La. 541, 99 So. 442 (1924); Van Dickson v.
Mayfleld, 158 La. 529, 104 So. 315 (1925).
12. Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1922) (mother) and Succession
of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1931) (father).
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the Code the presence of forced heirs of the parent of the natural
child blocks such legitimation. Hence there was no machinery for
legitimation under certain circumstances. For example, if F and
M had a natural child, married thereafter without having first
legitimated the child, then had another child or had a parent or
parents living, or had legitimate children by a previous marriage,
they could not legitimate the natural child.
The prohibition against legitimating adulterous or incestuous
children seems superfluous as the parents are barred from mar-
riage and hence from the use of this method of legitimation by
Articles 94, 95 and 161.
Act 286 of 1944 amended Article 2386 to read as follows:
"The fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife, wherever
the property be located and however administered, whether
natural, civil, including interest, dividends and rents, or from
the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership, if there
exists a conimunity of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by
a written instrument, shall declare that she reserves all of
such fruits for her own separate use and benefit and her inten-
tion to administer such property separately and alone. The
said instrument shall be executed before a Notary Public and
two witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of
the Parish where the community is domiciled.
If there is no community of gains, each party enjoys, as he
chooses, that which comes to his hand; but the fruits and
revenues which are existing at the dissolution of the marriage,
belong to the owner of the things which produce them."
This amendment eliminates the necessity for proof of ad-
ministration of the wife's property by the husband, formerly a
troublesome matter in many cases and particularly in connection
with tax returns. For those whose interests and tax savings
would lie in the other direction, the notarial act saving the ad-
ministration to the wife is provided. In the present drive for tax
saving there is a danger, however, of losing sight of vast numbers
of persons who do not pay heavy income taxes or whose individ-
ual needs and desires envisage separation of estates. The greatly
used device of simple notarial act might be put on the books
for the use of those persons who conceivably might have some
other family interest at heart than the saving of taxes.
1944]
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Act 232 of 1944 is a legislative veto of the court's rule of sus-
pension of prescription against majors when they are co-owners
of a mineral servitude with minors, under the theory of the in-
divisible nature of servitude. 3 The question in regard to royalty
per se had never been settled, so the legislature has anticipated
any future trouble on that issue. Those whose interests lie with
the old rule of "suspension for one suspends for all" have a year
within which to test their claims.
The act appears as follows:
"AN ACT
Relative to the suspension of pre'scription of mineral or royalty
rights by providing that the minority, or other disability of a
co-owner shall not suspend prescription as to the other co-
owners, and to provide a period in which persons hereby
affected may exercise their rights.
"Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana,
That despite the fact that among co-proprietors of any mineral
or royalty right there be one or more against whom prescription
cannot run, as, for instance, a minor, the liberative prescription
shall nevertheless run against the co-proprietors not under legal
disability.
"Section 2. That this Act is intended 'to and does affect pre-
sent.ly existing mineral or royalty rights; notwithstanding which,
any person whose rights would be affected hereby shall have a
period of one year from and after the effective date of this Act
in which to exercise his rights."
Act 295 of 1944 provides additional protection for the conven-
tional mortgagee. He has had protection against the mortgagor for
waste14 of the security but the new act . grants to him the same
rights as those of the mortgagor land owner against any and all
persons who should convert the immovables by nature upon the
mortgaged land. The act appears as follows:
"AN ACT
To authorize the holder of a conventional mortgage to recover for
the unauthorized removal, conversion or other disposition of
trees, buildings, or other immovables by nature.
13. Arts. 652, 656, 802, La. Civil Code of 1870; Daggett, Mineral Rights in
Louisiana (1939) 73 et seq.; Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
14. Federal Land Bank v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So. 370 (1934).
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"Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana that
the holder of a conventional mortgage shall have and enjoy the
same rights, privileges and actions as the mortgagor land owner
to recover against any person, firm or corporation who, without
the written consent of the mortgagee buys, sells, cuts, removes,
holds, disposes of, changes the form of, or otherwise converts to
the use of himself, itself or another, any trees, buildings, or
other immovables by nature covered by the mortgage.
"Section 2. That recovery by the mortgagee may not be for
more than the unpaid portion of the secured indebtedness, plus
interest thereon, advances thereunder, court costs and attorney's
fees, provided such recovery may be had severally or jointly with
the mortgagor land owner."
Act 172 of 1944 compiles, unifies and extends the previous
group of statutes dealing with chattel mortgage, brings the device
more closely in line with the law of mortgage and makes several
other minor changes.
The list of "masses and assemblages of things" which may be
mortgaged has been extended to include the following: "lumber,
logs, staves, cross-ties, tiles, bricks, loose cotton, cotton seed and
its by-products, live stock, poultry." The obligation secured must
be described and the exact sum and date of maturity stated. The
location of the mortgaged property must be stated. "In order to
affect third persons, every chattel mortgage must be by authentic
act, or by private act, duly authenticated in any manner provided
by law." It will be observed that the words, "without notice"
have been deleted so that the act now conforms with the law of
mortgage and that authentication is provided for by general
terms. Again, cancellation may be accomplished "in any manner
provided by law for the cancellation of mortgages on immovable
property."
The recordation rule has been changed in several ways that
appear decidedly advantageous. One, a multiple original is desig-
nated for filing. Two, the instrument must be filed in the parish of
the location of the chattel as stated in the instrument as well as
in the parish of the domicile of the mortgagor if he is domiciled
in the state. Three, if the mortgagor is not domiciled in the state
recordation in the parish where the chattel is to be located accord-
ing to the terms of the mortgage instrument is suffcient. The
third change enables a non-resident to comply with the law
which was not possible before.
1944]
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The reinscription provision has been clarified leaving no doubt
regarding the date from which prescription begins to run. The
previous act safeguarding the mortgage against effects of the doc-
trine of immovables by nature or destination has been incor-
porated as Section 7 of the new law. Section 9 gives protection
in general to all creditors and is set forth in clear and concise
terms. Recorders furnishing certificates are warranted a fee of
one dollar for each name in the certificate which seems a fair and
reasonable addition considering the work and responsibility in-
volved. Section 13 confirms the jurisprudence in excluding incor-
poreal movables as subject matter of a chattel mortgage. All
previous acts incorporated into the new act are repealed by num-
ber so that doubt and confusion in this regard should be avoided.
Thus, while not many actual changes have been made, those
appearing seem to have been purposeful and the unity, clarity,
and convenience resulting from the compilation and rewrite in'
themselves alone make the new act worth while.-5
Act Number 192 of 1944 amended and re-enacted Act 296 of
1910 in order to clarify and simplify the matter of divorce and
separation when the defendant is an absentee. The new act ap-
pears as follows:
"Section 1. That in any action for separation from bed
and board or divorce where the defendant is either absent
from the State, or his whereabouts are unknown, the court
having jurisdiction over the cause shall, upon application by
the plaintiff, appoint a curator ad hoc who shall be an attorney
at law, to represent the absent party and all proceedings shall
be had contradictorily with the said curator ad hoc, and any
judgment or divorce may be rendered against the curator that
might be rendered against his principal as if the principal
were present in person in open court, provided that upon the
trial of the cause upon the merits or upon confirmation of any
preliminary default therein, due proof shall be made of a dili-
gent effort on the part of the plaintiff to locate the said ab-
sentee, and provided further, that this act shall be made retro-
active-and fully effective as to suits presently pending."
15. For a comprehensive discussion of chattel mortgages in Louisiana, see
Daggett, Louisiana Privileges and Chattel Mortgage (1942) 12.
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